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ase 3:08-cv-03113-JSW

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Case 3:08-cv-03113-JSW

United Stare: District Court

For the Northern District of California

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RICHARD W. WIEKING CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLIE GROOMBRIDGE,

Plaintiff,

No. C00-01654 MMC

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REMAND; VACATING HEARING

ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (BHC), et al.,

Defendants.

## INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is plaintiff's motion to remand this action to state court on the grounds that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. An opposition and reply have been filed. Having considered the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court hereby VACATES the hearing scheduled for June 23, 2000, and GRANTS the motion.

#### **BACKGROUND**

On March 23, 2000, plaintiff Leslie Groombridge filed suit in San Francisco Superior Court, seeking damages for asbestos-related personal injury and disease stemming from his occupational exposure to asbestos-containing products manufactured by Rolls-Royce, PLC, formerly known as Rolls-Royce Allison and Allison Engine Company, Inc. ("Rolls-Royce"). (Compl. at 1.) On May 9, 2000, defendant removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442, and 1446. On May 25, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion to remand.

Plaintiff alleges that he was exposed to asbestos while working as a structural

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mechanic/aviation officer with the United States Navy between 1956 and 1958. (Not. of Removal at 2.) Specifically, plaintiff claims that he was exposed to asbestos in the course of repairing and maintaining the T56 engines manufactured by Rolls-Royce. (Not. of Removal at 2.)

Although, in its notice of removal, defendant asserted multiple bases of federal jurisdiction, defendant, in its opposition, relies solely on the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. In that regard, defendant argues the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1442(a)(1) for the reason that the T56 engine was manufactured by Rolls-Royce "under the authority of an officer or agency of the United States," (Not. of Removal at 3), and that the "United States Government had precise specifications, and exercised the strictest control, over the development of the T56 for its use in military aircraft." (Dft's Opp. at 3.)

#### DISCUSSION

# A. Legal Standard

The existence of federal jurisdiction for removal must normally be determined on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). The federal officer removal statute provides an exception to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989). "Under the federal officer removal statute, suits against federal officers may be removed despite the non-federal cast of the complaint; the federal question element is met if the defense depends on federal law." Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999).

To establish federal officer removal jurisdiction, the defendant must: (1) demonstrate that it acted under the direction of a federal officer; (2) raise a colorable federal defense to the plaintiff's claims; and (3) demonstrate a causal nexus between the plaintiff's claims and the acts the defendant performed under color of federal office. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 124-25, 134-35. In addition, the defendant must be a "person" within the meaning of § 1442(a)(1). See Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 572 (N.D. Cal. 1992).

The party seeking to remove an action has the burden of establishing federal

jurisdiction over a suit originally filed in state court. <u>See id.</u> Any doubt about the propriety of removal is resolved in favor of remand. <u>See Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co.</u>, 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979).

# B. Analysis

# 1. "Person" Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)

Plaintiff argues that Rolls-Royce is not a "person" under § 1442(a)(1). (Pl.'s Reply at 2-3.) While federal district courts are divided on this issue, the Court agrees with those courts that have held a corporation is a person within the meaning of § 1442(a)(1). See, e.g., Good v. Armstrong, 914 F. Supp. 1125, 1127-28 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Crocker v. Borden, 852 F. Supp. 1322, 1325 (E.D. La. 1994); Eung, 816 F. Supp. at 572; Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., 781 F. Supp. 934, 936 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Because Rolls-Royce is a corporation, the Court finds that it qualifies as a "person" under § 1442(a)(1).

# 2. "Acting Under" a Federal Officer and "Causal Nexus"

To establish that a defendant is "acting under" a federal officer, a federal officer must have had "direct and detailed control over the defendant." Fung, 816 F. Supp. at 572. Further, to establish a "causal nexus," it must appear that the state prosecution has arisen out of the acts done under color of federal authority and in enforcement of federal law.

Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 22 (1926).

Here, to support its contention that it was acting under the direct and detailed control of the federal government, defendant offers the affidavit of James L. Dillard ("Dillard"), a retired chief project engineer, and sixteen other exhibits. (See Dillard Aff.) The voluminous materials, however, contain no requirement or even reference to the use of asbestos.

Rather, the specifications indicate defendant was permitted to use "standard parts . . . unless they [were] determined by the contractor to be unsuitable for the purpose." (Dillard Aff., Ex. 12 at 365.)

This case thus is distinguishable from cases relied upon by defendant in which the government specified the use of asbestos. See Pack v. AC and S. Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (D. Md. 1993); Blackman v. Asbestos Defendants (BHC), 1997 WL 703773, \*2 (N.D.

Cal. 1999). See also Cabalic v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 1994 WL 564724 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (remanding on ground that defendant failed to provide evidence that the specifications required the use of asbestos).

Accordingly, the Court finds defendant has failed to show that it acted under the direction of a federal officer in using asbestos in the design, manufacture, or testing of the T56 engine or that a causal nexus exists between any government specification and plaintiff's claimed injury. Consequently, defendant cannot rely on the federal officer removal statute as a basis for the Court's jurisdiction, and, accordingly, removal was not proper.

## CONCLUSION

United States District Judge

For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS plaintiff's motion to remand.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

JUN 2 3 2000

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

the Northern District of California

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RICHARD W. WIEKING CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

#### FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY PIPPINS,

No. C 00-1356 WHA

No. C 00-1336 WHA

Plaintiff,

ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER 1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND CASE TO STATE COURT AND 2) DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ENTERED IN CIVIL DOCKET 6/24/00

#### INTRODUCTION

The Court cannot find on the present record that defendant Rolls-Royce, PLC, during its manufacture of jet aircraft engines for the United States Air Force and Navy, included asbestos in such engines at the direction of an Air Force or Naval officer. On that basis, the Court concludes that no subject-matter jurisdiction exists under 28 USC 1442. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiff's motion to remand the action to state court. The Court also DENIES as moot plaintiff's objection to defendant's supplemental brief.

#### **STATEMENT**

On March 15, 2000, plaintiff Henry Pippins filed a personal injury complaint in California Superior Court. The complaint alleged, among other things, that plaintiff had been exposed to asbestos during his 36-year career as a jet engine mechanic and materials specialist.

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One alleged source of such asbestos was the T56 jet engine, which defendant, formerly known as Allison Engine Co. Inc., manufactured for the Air Force and Navy.

Defendant removed the action to this Court, arguing that federal-question jurisdiction existed under 28 USC 1442, the federal officer removal statute, "because the action involves a person. i.e., Rolls-Royce, that acted under the authority of an officer or agency of the United States" (Notice of Removal 3:5-6). Plaintiff promptly moved for remand. In opposition to plaintiff's motion, defendant proffered evidence selected to show that "the United States Government was inextricably linked to the design and production of the T56 engine, and it unequivocally directed Allison in all such phases that form the basis of Plaintiff's claims against Rolls-Royce" (Opp. 3:15-17). According to defendant, such evidence demonstrated that:

- the Air Force and Navy maintained personnel at Allison's plant for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the government contract and specifications;
- the military specifications for the T56 were "specific, detailed and mandatory";
- the Air Force participated in the design and development of the T56, and made recommendations for design improvements; and
- no changes to the design of the T56 could be made without government design and approval.

#### **ANALYSIS**

In this case, removal is premised upon 28 USC 1442, an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999). "Under the federal officer removal statute, suits against federal officers may be removed despite the nonfederal cast of the complaint; the federal question element is met if the defense depends on federal law." *Ibid.* To create subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 USC 1442(a), the subsection here at issue, defendant must "(1) demonstrate that it acted under the direction of a federal officer, (2) raise a federal defense to plaintiffs' claims, and (3) demonstrate a causal nexus between plaintiffs' claims and acts it performed under color of federal office." Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F.Supp. 569, 571-72 (N.D. Cal. 1992), citing Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 124-25, 134-35 (1989).

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Application of the federal officer removal statute is not limited to cases in which the defendant demonstrates upon removal the meritoriousness of his or her alleged defense. "At the very least, it is broad enough to cover all cases where federal officers can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to enforce federal law." Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402. 406-07 (1969). See also Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 532 (reasoning that federal officer removal statute does not require the federal officer to demonstrate "an airtight case on the merits"). As in all removal scenarios, however, "[t]he burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal." Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court will remand the action unless defendant demonstrably has satisfied each of the three above-listed conditions.

As discussed above, defendant argues that it designed and manufactured the T56 "under the authority" of an officer of the United States. Hence, defendant concludes that it is entitled to removal. The Court disagrees, based upon defendant's failure to demonstrate that an officer of the United States directed it to perform those acts that plaintiff alleges to have harmed him.

In its briefs and at oral argument, defendant emphasized that it designed and manufactured the T56 under tight government supervision, that the engine was built to tight specifications, and that such specifications were subject to change only upon government approval. That "the relevant acts occurred under the general auspices of federal direction", however, is not enough to warrant removal. Good v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1125, 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1996), citing Fung, 816 F.Supp. at 572. Instead, a defendant seeking removal must demonstrate that it acted "according to the direct and detailed control of an officer of the United States." Good, 914 F.Supp. at 1128. With respect to products liability, that usually entails demonstrating "strong government intervention and the threat that a defendant will be sued in state court 'based upon actions taken pursuant to federal direction." Fung, 816 F.Supp. at 572, quoting Gulati v. Zuckerman, 723 F.Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1989).

Plaintiff alleges exposure to asbestos. If defendant's argument is to succeed, defendant must demonstrate a causal nexus between such exposure and acts performed by defendant

1	pursuant to the direction of some federal officer. This defendant cannot do. In the volume of
2	documents submitted by defendant and describing the oversight of the United States government
3	during the design and manufacturing of the T56, the word "asbestos" appears not once. Nor
4	during oral argument could defendant name a single asbestos-containing part that the
5	government directed it to incorporate into the engine. This is not a case where the government
6	"would specify and approve the type of asbestos" integrated into the object of manufacture.
7	Pack v. AC and S, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 1099, 1103 (D. Md. 1993). Nor is it a case in which the
8	government's "drawings and specifications required the use of asbestos materials." Blackman v.
9	Asbestos Defendants (BHC), No. C-97-3066, 1997 WL 703773, at *2 (N.D. Calif. Nov. 3, 1997).
10	Rather, this is a case in which defendant was permitted to use "standard parts unless they
11	[were] determined by the contractor to be unsuitable for the purpose" (Dillard Decl., Exh. 12 at
12	365). Defendant thus was free to use whatever standard parts it believed appropriate. No causal
13	relationship has been shown between defendant's alleged choice of asbestos and the
14	government's actual orders to defendant. Hence, plaintiff's motion to remand should be granted.
15	CONCLUSION
16	For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's motion is GRANTED. Furthermore, plaintiff's
17	objection to defendant's supplemental opposition is DENIED as MOOT.
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19	IT IS SO ORDERED.
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21	Dated: June 20, 2000 WILLIAM ALSUP
22	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

#### FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS PIPPINS and TOMMIE PIPPINS,

No. C 03-3006 WHA

Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND

ATLAS TURNER, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

#### INTRODUCTION

In this personal-injury case, defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation has failed to show that it was "acting under" a federal officer when it used asbestos materials in the design of Cougar airplanes for the United States Navy. Removal jurisdiction, therefore, is lacking under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Plaintiffs' motion to remand the action is GRANTED.

#### **STATEMENT**

On September 27, 2002, plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Pippins filed an action in state court for personal injuries Mr. Pippins purportedly sustained from asbestos exposure while working as an aviation mechanic on F9F Cougar airplanes at a naval air station in Kansas. The airplanes were manufactured for the Navy by Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, later acquired by defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation. The complaint alleges that, while servicing the aircrafts, Mr. Pippins was exposed to asbestos through the airplanes' brake linings and from asbestos tape and asbestos heat shield insulation (Dep. 92). Although companies other than defendant made all these asbestos-containing components, defendant

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incorporated them into the airplanes.

Defendant removed the action under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Defendant contends that it was acting under the government's control when it designed the Cougar aircraft. According to defendant, the government reviewed and approved defendant's design plans and drawings and its contract included detailed specifications on the design of the Cougar. Plaintiffs have now moved for remand.

#### ANALYSIS

This case involves the federal-officer removal statute, which allows removal of a state action against "any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office . . . . " 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) (emphasis added). To show it was "acting under" a federal officer, a removing party must:

(1) demonstrate that it acted under the direction of a federal officer; (2) raise a federal defense to the plaintiff's claims; and (3) demonstrate a causal nexus between the plaintiff's claims and acts it performed under color of federal office. Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 571–72 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citation omitted). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal. Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix, Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the action should be remanded unless defendant has satisfied each of the three conditions mentioned above.

As this Court has noted before in a similar decision involving the brother of Mr. Pippins, a mere showing that "the relevant acts occurred under the general auspices of federal direction" is not by itself enough to warrant removal. *Pippins v. Asbestos Defendants*, No. 00-1356 at 3 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 20, 2000) (citation omitted). Rather, a defendant seeking removal must demonstrate that it acted "according to the direct and detailed control" of a federal officer. *Ibid*.

Here, the only instance, at least at the initial design stage, where the Navy may have controlled the choice of Cougar parts was when it specified the Pratt & Whitney J48-P-8A engine to be incorporated. Otherwise, Northrop Grumman was free to submit whatever design it wished. Only upon acceptance by the Navy did the rest of the design become "government-specified." Mr. Pippins, however, allegedly suffered asbestos exposure not from the engine itself, but from the frequently replaced asbestos insulation shields wrapped around the engine, among other things. Hence, to establish that removal was proper

defendant must demonstrate that the Navy directed it to include asbestos materials in the original design. No such showing has been made.

Defendant, and not the Navy, furnished the design data and drawings of the aircraft as part of its contracted services (Oberg Exh. 1 at 1). Defendant was responsible for purchasing its own "materials, supplies and subassemblies" and accounting thereafter for the cost of those items (DeBois Exh. 1 at 3). There is no indication that the Navy had any hand in the selection of any asbestos materials. In this respect, defendant has not even shown that the Navy's specifications (after acceptance of the Cougar design) required the use of asbestos materials. In all the documents relating to the Cougar's design, the word "asbestos" appears not once. See Groombridge v. Asbestos Defendants, No. 00-01654 at 3 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 23, 2000) (Chesney, J.) (remanding because the defendants failed to submit any materials which required or even referenced asbestos). Instead, defendant's evidence only shows that the Navy directed it to manufacture the Cougar aircraft, and that the Navy "routinely specified" that asbestos materials be used in its aircraft (DeBois Decl. ¶ 15). No evidence is provided that the Navy specifically required the asbestos materials in the brake linings and engine insulation. These parts needed frequent servicing, and in a manner which created the asbestos dust that Mr. Pippins inhaled.

As such, this case is distinguishable from Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 572–73 (N.D. Cal. 1992), where the court found that the defendant company was acting under federal control when it built submarines for the Navy under extensive guidance. In Fung, the defendant company was employed to construct Navy submarines according to the Navy's clear specifications in Navy shipyards, where the Navy "monitored [the defendant's] performance at all times." Id. at 571, 573. This case, in comparison, does not involve a situation of such direct government control. Unlike the defendant in Fung, the record here shows that Northrop Grumman retained significant independent decision-making authority as to the design of the Cougar airplane.

Neither does Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969), sustain removal here.<sup>1</sup> In that case, the Supreme Court held that federal prison officials had met the "causal connection" requirement for removal by showing that they "were on duty, at their place of federal employment, at all the relevant times"

On September 8, 2003, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply. The motion for leave is GRANTED. The sur-reply was duly considered.

 when they allegedly abused the plaintiff prisoner in the process of designing airplanes for the Navy. *Id.* at 409. Applied here, defendant argues that it need not show that the Navy specifically ordered that asbestos materials be installed into the airplanes. Instead, defendant contends that the Navy's extensive *general* control of the Cougar's design and maintenance is enough for removal.

None of the considerations urging removal in *Willingham* urge removal here. The *Willingham* 

None of the considerations urging removal in Willingham urge removal here. The Willingham defendants were federal officers raising the defense of official immunity, and were being sued for acts done on federal property in order to enforce federal law. A main purpose of Section 1442(a)(1) is to allow federal officers to effectively enforce federal law. Id. at 406–07. In contrast, defendant here is a private corporation. Its alleged acts occurred on its own property and in fulfillment of a for-profit contract with the Navy. Many courts, moreover, have refused to extend Willingham's holding outside the law enforcement context. See, e.g., Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 133, 138 (1989) (refusing to allow removal where the plaintiffs were federal postal workers charged with criminal driving violations while on duty).

The removal point, then, boils down to whether a defendant is entitled to removal for an act that was not specifically ordered by the Navy, but was done in the course of fulfilling the Navy's request for airplanes. For the reasons stated, this order holds that such a generalized removal theory as used by defendant would open the floodgates. This Court construes removal jurisdiction under Section 1442(a)(1) more narrowly.

#### CONCLUSION

This order finds that defendant has not sustained its burden of showing a basis for removal.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion to remand is GRANTED. The Clerk will return this case to the state court.

Since defendant had a colorable basis for asserting that removal was proper, this order DENIES plaintiffs' request for an award of attorney's fees and costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 23, 2003.

/s/ William Alsup
WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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# Other Orders/Judgments

3:03-cv-03006 Pippins et al v. Atlas Turner Inc. et al

# U.S. District Court Northern District of California Notice of Electronic Filing or Other Case Activity

Filed 08/25/2008

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Case Name:

Pippins et al v. Atlas Turner Inc. et al

Case Number:

3:03-cv-03006

**Document Number: 30** 

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# **Docket Text:**

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND re [12], [13], [27]. Signed by Judge William Alsup on 9/23/03. (kyy)

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ee6163cd21ee59324281c0fb53f12b2a97c82e49b04773d2524189ee3b]]

## 3:03-cv-03006 Notice will be electronically mailed to:

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### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

#### FOR THE

#### NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS PIPPINS,

Case Number: CV03-03006 WHA

Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

٧.

ATLAS TURNER,

Defendant.

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California.

That on September 24, 2003, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

David R. Donadio Brayton & Purcell 222 Rush Landing Road Novato, CA 94948-6169

Laura Patricia Yee
Tucker Ellis & West
555 California Street
Suite 3130
San Francisco, CA 94104

Lillian C. Ma Tucker Ellis & West LLP 555 California Street Suite 3130 San Francisco, CA 94104-1607

Robert E. Boone III Bryan Cave LLP 120 Broadway Suite 300 Santa Monica, CA 90401

Dated: September 24, 2003.

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk By: dawn toland, Deputy Clerk

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XXX

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ATTORNEYS ATLAW
222 RUSH LANDING ROAD
NOVATO, CALIFORNIA 94945
(415) 898-1555

# PROOF OF SERVICE

I am employed in the County of Marin, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 222 Rush Landing Road, Novato, California 94948-6169.

On August 22, 2008 I served the attached:

# ADDENDUM IN SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND CASE TO STATE COURT

Robert Schoelzel, v. Asbestos Defendants, et al. USDC C-8-03113 JSW

on the interested parties in this action by transmitting a true copy thereof in a sealed envelope, and each envelope addressed as follows:

## TO ALL PARTIES ON THE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

BY OFFICE MAILING: I am readily familiar with this office's practice of collection and processing correspondence, pleadings and other matters for mailing with the United States Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Novato, California in the ordinary course of business. I placed in the outgoing office mail, the above-described document(s), in a sealed envelope, addressed to the party(ies) as stated above, for collection and processing for mailing the same day in accordance with ordinary office practices.

Executed this August 22, 2008 at Novato, California.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

JAŅE A. EHNI

Brayton-Purcell Service List

Document 23 Filed 08/25/2008

Page 19 of 21 Run By : Ehni, Jane (JAE)

Case 3:08-cv-03113-JSW Date Created: 8/22/2008-4:46:28 PM

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Berry & Berry P.O. Box 16070 2930 Lakeshore Avenue Oakland, CA 94610 510-835-8330 510-835-5117 (fax)

**Defendants: Defendants:** Berry & Berry (B&B)

**Burnham & Brown** 1901 Harrison Street 11th Floor
Oakland, CA 94612
510-444-6800 510-835-6666 (fax) **Defendants:** 

Borg-Warner Corporation by its Successor in Interest, BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc. (BWMORS)

**Howard Rome Martin & Ridley** 1775 Woodside Road, Suite 200 Redwood City, CA 94061 650-365-7715 650-364-5297 (fax) Defendants:

IMO Industries, Inc. (IMOIND)

Knox Ricksen LLP 1300 Clay Street, Suite 500 Oakland, CA 94612-1427 510-285-2500 510-285-2505 (fax) **Defendants:** 

Allis-Chalmers Corporation Product Liability Trust (ALLIS)

Law Offices of Peter C. Freeman 16485 Laguna Canyon Road, Ste. 230 Irvine, CA 92618 949-341-0500 949-341-0505 (fax) **Defendants:** Barr Lumber Company, Inc. (BARRLU)

**Perkins Coie LLP** Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 2400 San Francisco, CA 94111 415-344-7000 415-344-7288 (fax) **Defendants:** Georgia-Pacific Corporation (GP)

Honeywell International, Inc. (HONEYW)

Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, LLP 525 Market Street, 26th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105-2708 415-882-5000 415-882-0300 (fax) **Defendants:** Rapid-American Corporation (RAPID) **Bowman and Brooke LLP** 879 West 190th Street Suite 700 Gardena, CA 90248-4227 310-768-3068 310-719-1 310-719-1019 (fax)

Ford Motor Company (FORD) General Motors Corporation (GM)

Carroll, Burdick & McDonough Asbestos Case Coordinator 44 Montgomery Street, Ste. 400 San Francisco, CA 94104 415-989-5900 415-989-0932 (fax) Defendants: Warren Pumps, LLC (WARPUM)

Jackson & Wallace 55 Francisco Street

Sixth Floor San Francisco, CA 94133 415-982-6300 415-982-6700 (fax) **Defendants:** BW/IP International Inc. (BWIPIN)

Law Offices of Glaspy & Glaspy One Walnut Creek Center 100 Pringle Avenue, Suite 750 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 925-947-1300 925-947-1594 (fax) **Defendants:** Steego Corporation (STGCOR)

McKenna Long & Aldridge 101 California Street 41st Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 415-267-4000 415-267-4198 (fax) **Defendants:** Certainteed Corporation (CERT)

Pond North, LLP 350 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90071 213-617-6170 213-623-3594 (fax) Defendants: Viacom, Inc. (VIACOM)

Tucker Ellis & West LLP 135 Main Street, Suite 700 San Francisco, CA 94105 415-617-2400 415-617-2409 (fax) **Defendants:** Carrier Corporation (CARRCP)

Brydon Hugo & Parker 135 Main Street, 20th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105 415-808-0300 415-808-0333 (fax) Defendants: Foster Wheeler LLC (FKA Foster Wheeler Corporation) (FOSTER)

Gordon & Rees LLP Embarcadero Center West 275 Battery Street, 20<sup>th</sup> Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 415-986-5900 415-986-8054 (fax) **Defendants:** Ingersoll-Rand Company (INGRSL) Leslie Controls, Inc. (LESCON)

Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP 55 Second Street **Suite 1700** San Francisco, CA 94105 415-882-8200 415-882-8220 (fax) **Defendants:** Crane Co. (CRANCO)

Law Offices of Nancy E. Hudgins 565 Commercial, 4th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 415-979-0100 415-979-0747 (fax) **Defendants:** Uniroyal Holding, Inc. (UNIROY)

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP One Market, Spear Tower San Francisco, CA 94105 415-442-1000 415-442-1001 (fax) **Defendants:** Grinnell Corporation (GRINN)

Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold One Market Plaza Steuart Tower, 8th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105 415-781-7900 415-781-2635 (fax) **Defendants:** General Electric Company (GE)

Walsworth, Franklin, Beyins & McCall 601 Montgomery Street, 9th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 415-781-7072 415-391-6258 (fax) Defendants:

Thomas Dee Engineering Co., Inc. (DEE)

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NOVATO, CALIFORNIA 94948-6169 (415) 898-1555

BRAYTON PURCELL LL

#### PROOF OF SERVICE

I am employed in the County of Marin, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 222 Rush Landing Road, P.O. Box 6169, Novato, California 94948-6169.

On August 25, 2008, I served the following document(s) described as:

### APPENDIX OF CASES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT

Robert Schoelzel v. Asbestos Defendants, et al. USDC No. C08-03113 JSW

on the interested party(ies) in this action as follows:

#### TO ALL PARTIES ON THE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

BY PERSONAL MAILING: I deposited in the U.S. Mail at Novato, California, the above-described document(s), in a sealed envelope, with postage fully prepaid, addressed to the party(ies) as stated above.

XX BY OFFICE MAILING: I am readily familiar with this office's practice of collection and processing correspondence, pleadings and other matters for mailing with the United States Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Novato, California in the ordinary course of business. I placed in the outgoing office mail, the above-described document(s), in a sealed envelope, addressed to the party(ies) as stated above, for collection and processing for mailing the same day in accordance with ordinary office practices.

Executed this 25th day of August, 2008, at Novato, California.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Jane A. Ehni

Brayton-Purcell Service List
Case 3:08-cv-03113-JSW Document 23 Filed 08/25/2008 Page 21 of 21

Date Created: 8/25/2008-2:29:28 PM Created by: LitSupport - ServiceList - Live Matter Number: 105358.001 - Robert Schoelzel Run By : Ehni, Jane (JAE)

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510-835-8330 510-835-5117 (fax)
Defendants:

Berry & Berry (B&B)

Burnham & Brown
1901 Harrison Street
11<sup>th</sup> Floor
Oakland, CA 94612
510-444-6800 510-835-6666 (fax)
Defendants:

Borg-Warner Corporation by its Successor in Interest, BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc. (BWMORS)

Howard Rome Martin & Ridley 1775 Woodside Road, Suite 200 Redwood City, CA 94061 650-365-7715 650-364-5297 (fax) Defendants: IMO Industries, Inc. (IMOIND)

Knox Ricksen LLP 1300 Clay Street, Suite 500 Oakland, CA 94612-1427 510-285-2500 510-285-2505 (fax) Defendants:

Allis-Chalmers Corporation Product Liability Trust (ALLIS)

Law Offices of Peter C. Freeman 16485 Laguna Canyon Road, Ste. 230 Irvine, CA 92618 949-341-0500 949-341-0505 (fax) Defendants: Barr Lumber Company, Inc. (BARRLU)

Perkins Coie LLP
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415-344-7000 415-344-7288 (fax)
Defendants:
Georgia-Pacific Corporation (GP)
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